UnOriginalNuttah wrote:
Time will tell whether this is an enemy without the military ability to prevent it's own destruction or a movement capable of withstanding the coalition army until they are forced to withdraw and leave an unstable and bloody mess in their wake;
Their lack of military ability will not guarantee their destruction. They have the advantage of blending in with eveyrone else, and if they are smart can carry on for quite a long time. Here's the thing though: The longer they want to last, the fewer the offensive operations they can conduct, and the less effective they become. Any time they go out and do anything, they get torn up.
UnOriginalNuttah wrote:
However the ability to learn to pick battles which can be won, no matter how small, is a part of military ability; this why sniping and IEDs are used as a method to inflict casualties without getting drawn out into conventional conflict which will surely lead to destruction, and demonstrates the enemy is clearly aware of it's strengths and weaknesses. I simply got the impression when you spoke of rates of casualties that you were talking of collective ability to gain an overall victory to the entire war and not individual ability. Hence, this is what I offered my opinions on.
Casualties are a factor, but not the only factor. The most important factor is disruption of operations tempo. What I have said, and continue to say, is that their military ability is poor, even given their disadvantages. The Vietcong, facing a similar situation, fared much better against US troops. The casualties and disruption being caused to US forces in Iraq is not very good for a force of the size that we estimate the insurgents have. I grant you that their tactics are dictated by necessity, yet even so, they are failing to accomplish their MILITARY objectives. I hasten to add, that the threshold for their political objectives may be much lower.
UnOriginalNuttah wrote:
If you read back through what I posted, you will see that my very first post, and the issue of contention I raised was to this statement:
whittsend wrote:
This is a fact: Casualties are happening at such a slow rate for our army, that victory is almost assured, if given tiime.
I think the fundamental difference in our opinions is that you originally stated that victory was almost assured because of the slow rate of casualties for your army, and I saw this as an simplistic, unreliable and unproven indicator of victory and said so by attempting to demonstrate that the figures for the enemy are not reliable enough to do so.
I stand by that statement, in the context it was given...that of a political vacuum. In a purely military struggle, the end is certain. If politics is not a factor, and time is not a factor, the coalition forces cannot lose. BUT, as we all know, time and politics are very much factors in the outcome.
UnOriginalNuttah wrote:
You claim to have 'a feel' for the size of the enemy you are fighting and based your conclusions around that, which works for you but unfortunately doesn't convince me that you are a reliable source of intelliegence.
Then you clearly don't understand the intelligence business. How do you think intelligence officers estimate the size of enemy forces? They compile data collected by troops in contact with the enemy, coallate it, and make estimates. I was one of the troops supplying intelligence (often), and I was in contact with many others. Nevertheless, my opinion relies not only on experience, but on information which I have read (some of which I have supplied above). That information fits nicely with my own experience, and I believe it. You have dismissed the sources I have quoted above, but you have provided no alternatives...so I'm not sure why you have such a problem with those numbers. AGAIN: If you think my numbers are bad, show me some that you think are good.
UnOriginalNuttah wrote:
Given this, can I assume that you do not acknowledge that the war for hearts and minds is of importance to final victory, and that the military was wasting it's time when it set itself the goal of winning it? Even the Pentagon can acknowledge that on “the war of ideas or the struggle for hearts and minds”, to quote this
Pentagon report, “American efforts have not only failed, they may also have achieved the opposite of what they intended”. I consider this the ability to win this battle in any theater of conflict a part of military ability, and believe that did the US not give support to other totalitarian regimes it would have been less open to criticism.
I do not assume that the 'battle for hearts and minds' is meaningless, but it is merely one factor of many. Given the overwhelming strength and ability of our forces, as compared to those of the enemy, it is not a great enough factor to affect the outcome in a purely military conflict. BUT, this is not a purely military conflict, and the 'hearts and minds' issue is much more important for the political conflict. Nevertheless, while the people of Iraq may not like us too much, I'm certain they have no love for the insurgents either. In fact, given the insurgents' tactics of indescriminate killing of Iraqis, thier own 'hearts and minds' problem may be their undoing in the long run. Thus, the issue of 'hearts and minds' is no advantage for them, and is therefore not as much of a disadvantage for us as it could be.
UnOriginalNuttah wrote:
I cannot be swayed in my opinion that the very purpose of the UN is to ensure that these problems are resolved as fairly and even handedly as possible, without causing unnecessary danger to and sacrifice by the troops of one particular nation.
And I cannot be swayed in my opinion that as a military force the UN is entirely useless.
UnOriginalNuttah wrote:
In case I wasn't clear enough I gave: 1, 2, and 3 to the occupation resistance fighters, 5 to the coalition and I gave points 4, 6 and 7 to neither side. I then said that I thought it would be a more even field, had point 1 gone to the invading army. What did you say before? Listen, learn, and verify?
The context of that comment was in dealing with a primary source. You are not one in this case, but I am. In any case, did you not read my comments? You still insist that the insurgents have the advantage according to Sun Tzu? I think you need to understand Sun Tzu a little better:
1) Moral right. I already addressed this:
whittsend wrote:
Because the primary impact of the 'moral' factors is one of morale, it is only important that troops BELIEVE they are in a moral fight, regardless of whether they actually are. Your opinions of the actuality of the situation notwithstanding, I can assure you most troops are not worred about the morality of their presence.
This is a tie. Both sides believe they have right on their side.
2) Quality of Generals.
UnOriginalNuttah wrote:
George Bush is your Commander-in-chief, sorry to be the one to break it to you.
Yes, but that occupation doesn't include being a General, or leading the troops on the ground. Sun Tzu's advice is aimed at one leading forces...the objectives are immaterial, except insofar as they affect the morality of the conflict. I have already address morality in 1 (above), and As GWB is not a leader of men, he does not enter the equation for 2.
UnOriginalNuttah wrote:
He sets the objectives of the military and by doing so, determines whether the military has objectives which they can actually meet.
And what objective has been set that the military can't meet? None that I am aware of. In any case, Sun Tzu is referring to quality of leadership, not quality of objectives.
The distinction between the duties of a General and that of a Sovereign are clear.
http://www.online-literature.com/suntzu/artofwar/0/ wrote:
Ssu-ma Ch`ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzu: [1]
--
Sun Tzu Wu was a native of the Ch`i State. His ART OF
WAR brought him to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu. Ho
Lu said to him: "I have carefully perused your 13 chapters.
May I submit your theory of managing soldiers to a slight
test?"
Sun Tzu replied: "You may."
Ho Lu asked: "May the test be applied to women?"
The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements
were made to bring 180 ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzu
divided them into two companies, and placed one of the King's
favorite concubines at the head of each. He then bade them
all take spears in their hands, and addressed them thus: "I
presume you know the difference between front and back, right
hand and left hand?"
The girls replied: Yes.
Sun Tzu went on: "When I say "Eyes front," you must
look straight ahead. When I say "Left turn," you must face
towards your left hand. When I say "Right turn," you must
face towards your right hand. When I say "About turn," you
must face right round towards your back."
Again the girls assented. The words of command having
been thus explained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes
in order to begin the drill. Then, to the sound of drums, he
gave the order "Right turn." But the girls only burst out
laughing. Sun Tzu said: "If words of command are not clear
and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, then
the general is to blame."
So he started drilling them again, and this time gave
the order "Left turn," whereupon the girls once more burst
into fits of laughter. Sun Tzu: "If words of command are
not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly
understood, the general is to blame. But if his orders ARE
clear, and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the
fault of their officers."
So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies
to be beheaded. Now the king of Wu was watching the scene
from the top of a raised pavilion; and when he saw that his
favorite concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly
alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following message: "We
are now quite satisfied as to our general's ability to handle
troops. If We are bereft of these two concubines, our meat
and drink will lose their savor. It is our wish that they
shall not be beheaded."
Sun Tzu replied: "Having once received His Majesty's
commission to be the general of his forces, there are certain
commands of His Majesty which, acting in that capacity, I am
unable to accept."
Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and
straightway installed the pair next in order as leaders in
their place. When this had been done, the drum was sounded
for the drill once more; and the girls went through all the
evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, marching
ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or standing, with perfect
accuracy and precision, not venturing to utter a sound. Then
Sun Tzu sent a messenger to the King saying: "Your soldiers,
Sire, are now properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for
your majesty's inspection. They can be put to any use that
their sovereign may desire; bid them go through fire and
water, and they will not disobey."
But the King replied: "Let our general cease drilling
and return to camp. As for us, We have no wish to come down
and inspect the troops."
Thereupon Sun Tzu said: "The King is only fond of
words, and cannot translate them into deeds."
After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzu was one who knew how
to handle an army, and finally appointed him general. In the
west, he defeated the Ch`u State and forced his way into
Ying, the capital; to the north he put fear into the States
of Ch`i and Chin, and spread his fame abroad amongst the
feudal princes. And Sun Tzu shared in the might of the King.
That anecdote makes it about as clear as it can be made....Bush isn't the one Sun Tzu is referring to in #2. Those are the Generals on the ground, who have the responsibility of actually leading the troops. They should, and MUST do what needs to be done to win once the soveriegn sets the objective. The Coalition Generals are FAR superior to anything the enemy has. Factor two easily goes to the Coalition. To say otherwise is ridiculous.
UnOriginalNuttah wrote:
He's the one who should be reading the Art of Warfare.
Reading it isn't enough...one must understand it. You should read it more carefully.
3) Advantages of Heaven and Earth (i.e. Environment). Coalition forces operate with impunity in Iraq, any time, any place. Insurgents do not. Coalition forces have the training and understanding to dominate in any conditions. Insurgents do not. Advantage Coalition.
4) Discipline.
whittsend wrote:
UnOriginalNuttah wrote:
4. Are coalition soldiers more disciplined? Who can say,
I can. They absolutely are.
UnOriginalNuttah wrote:
but certainly the swift and brutal punishment of the type used by the resistance soldiers could be considered a rigourous enforcement. The extraordinary military expenditure in fighting the war could also be considered as poor discipline, but Sun Tzu's definition in part 10 above.
Read your own quote. The resistance isn't a properly marshalled army, they are a poorly organised rabble.
To say that great military expense is a lack of discipline, is to take Sun Tzu out of context. He was referring to the discipline of the soldiers, not of the sovereign. Advantage, Coalition.
5) Strength. You have already conceded this point...no discussion necessary.
6) Training. Please be serious.
whittsend wrote:
UnOriginalNuttah wrote:
6. For many of the US soldiers, who are often quite young or reservists, this is a first assignment and they have little experience of fighting this kind of guerilla warfare. This may or may not be true for the enemy so I conclude that this cannot be compared.
It was my third deployment...about half the soldiers in my reserve unit had previous deployments under their belt, including most of the senior NCO's. My prior experience included fighting insurgents in Mogadishu. Allied forces not only have as much experience as the insurgents (many of whom are foreign and/or young), but we have a GREAT DEAL more INSTITUTIONAL experience. Yes, the Army has a memory, and even if the officers don't always remember, the NCO's generally do.
I will add to what I have already said, the the occupation of US troops when they are not fighting, is training. That is all they do...fight or train. Ask anyone in the combat arms. Advantage Coalition.
7) Constancy of Reward and Punishment. Constancy of Reward is probably equal, but Constancy of Punishment is probably more regular on the Coalition side. I'll be generous and call this one a draw.
5 of Sun Tzu's factors easily go to the Coalition and two are ties. You may disagree, but you are taking great liberties, both in your interpretation of what Sun Tzu is saying, and with how it is applied. I have no doubt whatsoever that Sun Tzu would laugh at the prospects of the Insurgents.
Clausewitz, on the other hand, would call it a bit closer...
UnOriginalNuttah wrote:
I don't know where you got the impression that I thought it was one sniper in the video.
The context of the discussion was that Juba is bollocks because the quality of the insurgents is so mind bogglingly poor. That pretty much sums it up.
Edit:
I almost forgot:
UnOriginalNuttah wrote:
I personally think it is a shame that the views of the soldiers on this forum have so far been quite one sided on the whole Iraq issue, but I am heartened that not all share these views:
This is not a coincidence, because most troops have shared experience, and shared opinions on the matter. Some will disagree, but that is unavoidable. Most troops will concur with what Gunslinger and I have said. Does it not mean anything to you that the majority have largely concurrent views? Perhaps you shouldn't dismiss those views so casually.
Last edited by whittsend (2006-03-30 08:17:39)